**Eight**

**THE POLITICAL TECHNOLOGY OF INDIVIDUALS**

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The general framework of what I call the “Technologies of the Self” is a question which appeared at the end of the eighteenth century. It was to become one of the poles of modern philosophy. This question is very different from what we call the traditional philosophical questions: What is the world? What is man? What is truth? What is knowledge? How can we know something? And so on. The question, I think, which arises at the end of the eighteenth century is: What are we in our actuality? You will find the formulation of this question in a text written by Kant. I don’t pretend that the previous questions about truth, knowledge, and so on have to be put aside. On the contrary, they constitute a very strong and consistent field of analysis, what I would like to call the formal ontology of truth. But I think that a new pole has been constituted for the activity of philosophizing, and this pole is characterized by the question, the permanent and ever-changing question, “What are we today?” And that is, I think, the field of the historical reflection on ourselves. Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Nietzsche, Max Weber, Husserl, Heidegger, the Frankfurterschule, have tried to answer this question. What I am trying to do, referring to this tradition, is to give very partial and provisory

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answers to this question through the history of thought or, more precisely, through the historical analysis of the relationships between our thought and our practices in Western society.

Let's say very briefly that through studying madness and psychiatry, crime and punishment, I have tried to show how we have indirectly constituted ourselves through the exclusion of some others: criminals, mad people, and so on. And now my present work deals with the question: How did we directly constitute our identity through some ethical techniques of the self which developed through antiquity down to now? That was what we were studying in the seminar.

There now is another field of questions that I would like to study; the way by which, through some political technology of individuals, we have been led to recognize ourselves as a society, as a part of a social entity, as a part of a nation or of a state. I would like now to give you an aperçu, not of the technologies of the self but of the political technology of individuals.

Of course, I am afraid that the material I have to deal with could be a little too technical and historical for a so-called public lecture. I am not a public lecturer, and I know this material would be much more convenient for a seminar. But I have two good reasons to present it to you in spite of the fact it may be too technical. First, I think it is always a little pretentious to present in a more or less prophetic way what people have to think. I prefer to let them draw their own conclusions or infer general ideas from the interrogations I try to raise by analyzing historical and specific material. I think it's much more respectful for everyone's freedom, and that's my manner. The second reason why I will present rather technical materials to you is that I don't know why people in a public lecture would be less clever, less smart, or less well read than in a classroom. Let us then begin with this problem of the political technology of individuals.

In 1779, the first volume of a book entitled *System einer vollständigen Medizinische Polizei* by the German author J. P. Frank was brought out, to be followed by five other tomes. And when the last volume was published in 1790, the French Revolution had already begun. Why do I bring together this celebrated event of the French Revolution and this obscure book? The reason is simple. Frank's work is the first great systematic program of public health for the modern state. It indicates with a lot of detail what an administration has to do to insure the wholesome food, good housing, health care, and medical institutions which the population needs to remain healthy, in short, to foster the life of individuals. Through this book we can see that the care for individual life is becoming at this moment a duty for the state.

At the same moment the French Revolution gives the signal for the great national wars of our days, involving national armies and meeting their conclusion or their climax in huge mass slaughters. I think that you can see a similar phenomenon during the Second World War. In all history it would be hard to find such butchery as in World War II, and it is precisely this period, this moment, when the great welfare, public health, and medical assistance programs were instigated. The Beveridge program has been, if not conceived, at least published at this very moment. One could symbolize such a coincidence by a slogan: Go get slaughtered and we promise you a long and pleasant life. Life insurance is connected with a death command.

The coexistence in political structures or large destructive mechanisms and institutions oriented toward the care of individual life is something puzzling and needs some investigation. It is one of the central antinomies of our political reason. It is this antinomy of our political rationality which I'd like to consider. I don't mean that mass slaughters are the effect, the result, the logical consequence of our rationality, nor do I mean that the state has the obligation of taking care of individuals since it has the right to kill millions of people. Neither do I want to deny that mass slaughters or social care have their economic explanations or their emotional motivations.
Excuse me if I go back to the same point: We are thinking beings. That means that even when we kill or when we are killed, even when we make war or when we ask for support as unemployed, even when we vote for or against a government which cuts social security expenses and increases defense spending, even in these cases, we are thinking beings, and we do these things not only on the ground of universal rules of behavior but also on the specific ground of a historical rationality. It is this rationality, and the death and life game which takes place in it, that I'd like to investigate from a historical point of view. This type of rationality, which is one of the main features of the modern political rationality, developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries through the general idea of the “reason of state” and also through a very specific set of techniques of government which were called at this moment, and with a very special meaning, the police.

Let's begin with the “reason of state.” I'll recall briefly a few definitions borrowed from Italian and German authors. An Italian jurist, Botero, at the end of the sixteenth century, gives this definition of the reason of state: “A perfect knowledge of the means through which states form, strengthen themselves, endure and grow.” Another Italian author, Palazzo, writes in the beginning of the seventeenth century [Discourse on Government and True Reason of State, 1606]: “A reason of state is a rule or an art enabling us to discover how to establish peace and order within the republic.” And Chemnitz, a German author in the middle of the seventeenth century [De Ratione Status, 1647], gives this definition: “A certain political consideration required for all public matters, councils, and projects, whose only aim is the state's preservation, expansion, and felicity”—note those words: the state's preservation, the state's expansion, and the state's felicity—“to which end, the easiest and the promptest means are to be employed.”

Let’s consider certain features those definitions have in common. Reason of state, first, is regarded as an “art,” that is, as a technique conforming to certain rules. These rules pertain not simply to customs and traditions but to a certain rational knowledge. Nowadays, the expression “reason of state,” as you know, evokes much more arbitrariness or violence. But, at the time, what people had in mind was a rationality specific to the art of governing states. From where does this specific art of government draw its rationale? The answer to this question, provoked at the beginning of the seventeenth century, is the scandal of the nascent political thought, and yet the answer, following the authors I have quoted, was very simple. The art of governing people is rational on the condition that it observes the nature of what is governed, that is, the state itself.

Now, to formulate such an evidence, such a platitude, was in fact to break simultaneously with two opposite traditions: the Christian tradition and Machiavelli’s theory. The Christian tradition claimed that if government was to be essentially just, it had to respect a whole system of laws: human, natural, and divine.

There is a significant text written by Saint Thomas on this point, where he explains that the king's government must imitate God's government of nature: The king must found cities just as God has created the world; he must lead man toward his finality just as God does for natural beings. And what is man's finality? Is it physical health? No, answers Saint Thomas. If physical health were the finitude of man, then we would need not a king but a physician. Is it wealth? No, because in this case a steward and not a king would suffice. Is it truth? No, answers Saint Thomas, because to attain truth we don't need a king, we need only a teacher. Man needs someone capable of opening up the way to heavenly bliss through his conformity on earth to what is bonestum. A king has to lead man toward bonestum as his natural and divine finality.

Saint Thomas's model for rational government is not at all a
political one, whereas in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries people are seeking for other denominations of reason of state, principles capable of guiding an actual government. They are concerned with what the state is and not with the divine or the natural finalities of man.

Reason of state is also opposed to another kind of analysis. In *The Prince*, Machiavelli’s problem is to decide how a province or a territory acquired through inheritance or by conquest can be held against its internal and external rivals. Machiavelli’s entire analysis is aimed at defining what reinforces the link between prince and state, whereas the problem posed in the beginning of the seventeenth century by the notion of reason of state is that of the very existence and nature of this new entity which is the state itself. The theoreticians of reason of state tried to keep aloof from Machiavelli both because he had at this moment a very bad reputation and because they couldn’t recognize their own problem in his problem, which was not the problem of the state but the problem of the relationships between the prince—the king—and his territory and his people. Despite all the quarrels about the prince and Machiavelli’s work, reason of state is a milestone in the emergence of an extremely different type of rationality from that of the conception of Machiavelli. The aim of this new art of governing is precisely not to reinforce the power of the prince. Its aim is to reinforce the state itself.

In a few words, reason of state refers neither to the wisdom of God nor to the reason or the strategies of the prince. It refers to the state, to its nature, and to its own rationality. This thesis that the aim of a government is to strengthen the state itself implies several ideas which I think are important to touch upon to follow the rise and development of our modern political rationality.

The first of those ideas is the new relation between politics as a practice and as knowledge. It concerns the possibility of a specific political knowledge. Following Saint Thomas, the king had only to be virtuous. The leader of the city in the Platonic republic had to be a philosopher. For the first time, the one who has to rule others in the framework of the state has to be a politician, has to attain a specific political competence and knowledge.

The state is something which exists per se. It is a kind of natural object, even if the jurists try to know how it can be constituted in a legitimate way. The state is by itself an order of things, and political knowledge separates it from juridical reflections. Political knowledge deals not with the rights of people or with human or divine laws but with the nature of the state which has to be governed. Government is possible only when the strength of the state is known: It is by this knowledge that it can be sustained. The state’s capacity and the means to enlarge it must be known. The strength and the capacity of other states, rivals of my own state, must also be known. The governed state must hold out against the others. A government, therefore, entails more than just implementing general principles of reason, wisdom, and prudence. A certain specific knowledge is necessary: concrete, precise, and measured knowledge as to the state’s strength. The art of governing characteristic of the reason of state is intimately bound up with the development of what was called, at this moment, political arithmetic. Political arithmetic was the knowledge implied by political competence, and you know very well that the other name of this political arithmetic was statistics, a statistics related not at all to probability but to the knowledge of state, the knowledge of different states’ respective forces.

The second important point derived from this idea of reason of state is the rise of new relationships between politics and history. The true nature of the state in this perspective is not conceived anymore as an equilibrium between several elements that only a good law could bring and maintain together. It is conceived as a set of forces and strengths that could be increased or weakened according to the politics followed by the governments. These forces have to be increased since each state is in a permanent competition with other countries, other nations, and other states,
so that each state has nothing before it other than an indefinite future of struggles, or at least of competitions, with similar states. The idea which had been predominant throughout the Middle Ages was that all the kingdoms on the earth would be one day unified in one last empire just before the Christ’s return to earth. From the beginning of the seventeenth century, this familiar idea is nothing more than a dream, which was also one of the main features of political thought, or of historical-political thought, during the Middle Ages. This project of reconstituting the Roman Empire vanishes forever. Politics now has to deal with an irreducible multiplicity of states struggling and competing in a limited history.

The third idea we can derive from this notion of reason of state is this: Since the state is its own finality and since the governments must have for an exclusive aim not only the conservation but also the permanent reinforcement and development of the state’s strengths, it is clear that the governments don’t have to worry about individuals; or government has to worry about them only insofar as they are somehow relevant for the reinforcement of the state’s strength: what they do, their life, their death, their activity, their individual behavior, their work, and so on. I would say that in this kind of analysis of the relationships between the individual and the state, the individual becomes pertinent for the state insofar as he can do something for the strength of the state. But there is in this perspective something which we could call a kind of political marginalism, since what is in question here is only political utility. From the state’s point of view, the individual exists insofar as what he does is able to introduce even a minimal change in the strength of the state, either in a positive or in a negative direction. It is only insofar as an individual is able to introduce this change that the state has to do with him. And sometimes what he has to do for the state is to live, to work, to produce, to consume; and sometimes what he has to do is to die.

Apparently those ideas are similar to a lot of ideas we can find in Greek philosophy. And, indeed, reference to Greek cities is very current in this political literature of the beginning of the seventeenth century. But I think that under a few similar themes something quite different is going on in this new political theory. The marginalistic integration of individuals in the state’s utility is not obtained in the modern state by the form of the ethical community which was characteristic of the Greek city. It is obtained in this new political rationality by a certain specific technique called then, and at this moment, the police.

Here we meet the problem I would like to analyze in some future work. The problem is this: Which kind of political techniques, which technology of government, has been put to work and used and developed in the general framework of the reason of state in order to make of the individual a significant element for the state? Most of the time, when one analyzes the role of the state in our society, either one focuses attention on institutions—armies, civil service, bureaucracy, and so on—and on the kind of people who rule them, or one analyzes the theories or the ideologies which were developed in order to justify or to legitimate the existence of the state.

What I am looking for, on the contrary, are the techniques, the practices, which give a concrete form to this new political rationality and to this new kind of relationship between the social entity and the individual. And, surprisingly enough, people, at least in countries like Germany and France, where for different reasons the problem of state was considered as a major issue, recognized the necessity of defining, describing, and organizing very explicitly this new technology of power, the new techniques by which the individual could be integrated into the social entity. They recognized its necessity, and they gave it a name. This name in French is police, and in German, Polizei. (I think the meaning of the English word, police, is something very different.) We must precisely try to give better definitions of what was understood by those French and German words, police and Polizei.

The meaning of these German and French words is puzzling
since they have been used at least from the nineteenth century until now to designate something else, a very specific institution which at least in France and Germany—I don’t know about the United States—didn’t always have a very good reputation. But, from the end of the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth century, the words police and Polizei had a very broad and, at the same time, also a very precise meaning. When people spoke about police at this moment, they spoke about the specific techniques by which a government in the framework of the state was able to govern people as individuals significantly useful for the world.

In order to analyze a little more precisely this new technology of government, I think that it is best to catch it in the three major forms that any technology is able to take in its development and its history: as a dream or, better, as a utopia; then as a practice or as rules for some real institutions; and then as an academic discipline.

Louis Turquet de Mayenne provides a good example at the beginning of the seventeenth century of contemporary opinion concerning the utopian or universal technique of government. His book, La Monarchie aristo-démocratique (1611), proposed the specialization of executive power and of police powers. The task of the police was to foster civil respect and public morality.

Turquet proposed that there should be in each province four boards of police to keep law and order, two of which see to the people and two others which had to see to things. The first board was to look after the positive, active, productive aspects of life. In other words, this board was concerned with education, with determining very precisely each individual’s aptitudes and tastes. It had to test the aptitude of the children from the very beginning of their lives. Each person over the age of twenty-five had to be enrolled on a register noting his aptitudes and his occupation; the rest were regarded as the dregs of society.

The second board was to see to the negative aspects of life, that is, the poor, widows, orphans, the aged, who required help. It had to be concerned also with people who had to be put to work and who could be reluctant to go to work, those whose activities required financial aid, and it had to run a kind of bank for the giving or lending of funds to people in need. It also had to take care of public health, diseases, epidemics, and accidents such as fire and floods, and it had to manage a kind of insurance for people to be protected against all such accidents.

The third board was to specialize in commodities and manufacturers’ goods. It indicated what was to be produced and how. It also controlled markets and trading, which was a very traditional function of police. The fourth board was to see to the demesne, that is, to territory, space, private property, legacies, donations, sales, and also to manorial rights, roads, rivers, public buildings, and so on.

Many features of this text are akin to the political utopias which were so frequent at the time, and even from the sixteenth century. But it is also contemporary with the great theoretical discussions about the reason of state and about the administrative organization of monarchies. It is highly representative of what the epoch considered a well-governed state.

What does this text demonstrate? It demonstrates first that ‘the police’ appear as an administration heading the state together with the judiciary, the army, and the exchequer. But in fact it embraces all those other administrations, and as Turquet says, “It branches out into all of the people’s conditions, everything they do or undertake. Its fields comprise justice, finance, and the army.”

So, as you see, the police in this utopia include everything, but from a very particular point of view. Men and things are envisioned in this utopia in their relationships. What the police are concerned with is men’s coexistence in a territory, their relationships to property, what they produce, what is exchanged in the market, and so on. It also considers how they live, the diseases and accidents which can befall them. In a word, what the
police see to is a live, active, and productive man. Turquet employs a very remarkable expression. He says, "The police's true object is man."

Of course, I am a little afraid that you imagine that I have forged this expression in order to find one of those injurious aphorisms which are supposed to be my favorite manner, but it's a real quotation. Don't imagine that I am saying that man is only a by-product of police. What's important in this idea of man as the true object of police is a historical change in the relations between power and individuals. To put it roughly, I would say that the feudal power consisted in relations between juridical subjects insofar as they were engaged in juridical relations by birth, status, or personal engagement, but with this new police state the government begins to deal with individuals, not only according to their juridical status but as men, as working, trading, living beings.

Now let's turn from the dream to the reality and to administrative practices. We have a compendium written in France in the beginning of the eighteenth century which gives us in systematic order the major police regulations of the French kingdom. It is a kind of manual or systematic encyclopedia for the use of the civil servants. The author of this manual was N. Delamare, and he organizes this encyclopedia of police [Traité de la police, 1705] under eleven chapters. The first one is religion; the second is morals; the third, health; the fourth, supplies; the fifth, roads, highways, and town buildings; the sixth, public safety; the seventh, the liberal arts (roughly speaking, the arts and sciences); the eighth, trade; the ninth, factories; the tenth, maidservants and factory workers; and the eleventh, the poor. That, for Delamare and those following, was the administrative practice of France. That was the domain of police, from religion to poor people, through morals, health, liberal arts, and so on and so on. You'll find the same classification in most of the treatises or compendiums concerning the police. As you see, as in Turquet's utopia, apart from the army and justice, properly speaking, and direct taxes, the police apparently see to everything.

Now what, from this point of view, was the real administrative French practice? What was the logic of intervening in religious rites or in small-scale production techniques, in intellectual life or in the road network? Delamare seems to be a little hesitant trying to answer this question. Sometimes he says, "The police must see to everything pertaining to men's happiness." In other places he says, "The police see to everything regulating society," and he means by "society" social relations "carried on between men." And sometimes, again, he says that the police see to living. This is the definition which I'd like to retain because it is the most original. I think that this definition clarifies the other definitions, and it is on this definition of police as taking care of living that Delamare insists. He makes the following remarks as to the police's eleven objects. The police deal with religion, not, of course, from the point of view of dogmatic orthodoxy but from the point of view of the moral quality of life. In seeing to health and supplies, the police deal with the preservation of life. Concerning trade, factories, workers, the poor, and public order, the police deal with the conveniences of life. In seeing to the theater, literature, and entertainment, their object is life's pleasure. In short, life is the object of the police. The indispensable, the useful, and the superfluous: Those are the three types of things that we need, or that we can use in our lives. That people survive, that people live, that people do even better than just survive or live: That is exactly what the police have to insure.

This systematization of the French administrative practice seems to me important for several reasons. First, as you see, it attempts to classify needs, which is, of course, an old philosophical tradition, but with the technical project of determining the correlation between the utility scale for individuals and the utility scale for the state. The thesis in Delamare's book is that what is superfluous for individuals can be
indispensable for the state, and vice versa. The second important thing is that Delamare makes a political object of human happiness. I know very well that from the beginnings of political philosophy in Western countries everybody knew and said that the happiness of people had to be the permanent goal of governments, but then happiness was conceived as the result or the effect of a really good government. Now happiness is not only a simple effect. Happiness of individuals is a requirement for the survival and development of the state. It is a condition, it is an instrument, and not simply a consequence. People's happiness becomes an element of state strength. And, third, Delamare says that the state has to deal not only with men, or with a lot of men living together, but with society. Society and men as social beings, individuals with all their social relations, are now the true object of the police.

And now, last but not least, "police" became a discipline. It was not only a real administrative practice, it was not only a dream, it was a discipline in the academic meaning of the word. It was taught under the name of Polizeiwissenschaft in various universities in Germany, especially in Goettingen. The University of Goettingen has been extremely important for the political history of Europe, since it was at Goettingen that Prussian, Austrian, and Russian civil servants were trained, precisely those who were to carry out Joseph II's or the Great Catherine's reforms. And several Frenchmen, especially in Napoleon's entourage, knew the teaching of this Polizeiwissenschaft.

The most important testimony we have about the teaching of police is a kind of manual for the students of Polizeiwissenschaft, written by von Justi, with the title, Elements of Police. In this book, in this manual for students, the purpose of the police is still defined, as in Delamare, as taking care of individuals living in society. Nevertheless, the way von Justi organizes his book is quite different from Delamare's book. He studies first what he called the "state's landed property," that is, its territory. He considers it under two different aspects: how it is inhabited (town versus country), and then who inhabits these territories (the number of people, their growth, their health, their mortality, immigration, and so on). Then, von Justi analyzes the "goods and chattels," that is, the commodities, manufacture of goods, and their circulation, which involved problems pertaining to cost, credit, and currency. And, finally, the last part of his study is devoted to the conduct of individuals, their morals, their occupational capabilities, their honesty, and how they are able to respect the law.

In my opinion, von Justi's work is a much more advanced demonstration of how the police evolved than Delamare's introduction to his compendium, and there are several reasons for that. The first is that von Justi draws an important distinction between what he calls police (die Polizei) and what he calls politics (die Politik). Die Politik is basically for him the negative task of the state. It consists in the state's fighting against its internal and external enemies, using the law against the internal enemies and the army against the external ones. Von Justi explains that the police (Polizei), on the contrary, have a positive task. Their instruments are neither weapons nor laws, defense nor interdiction. The aim of the police is the permanently increasing production of something new, which is supposed to foster the citizens' life and the state's strength. The police govern not by the law but by a specific, a permanent, and a positive intervention in the behavior of individuals. Even if the semantic distinction between Politik endorsing negative tasks and Polizei insuring positive tasks soon disappeared from political discourse and from the political vocabulary, the problem of a permanent intervention of the state in social processes, even without the form of the law, is, as you know, characteristic of our modern politics and of political problematics. The discussion from the end of the eighteenth century till now about liberalism, Polizeistaat, Reichsstaat of law, and so on, originates in this problem of the
positive and the negative tasks of the state, in the possibility that the state may have only negative tasks and not positive ones and may have no power of intervention in the behavior of people.

There is another important point in this conception of von Justi that has been very influential with all the political and administrative personnel of the European countries at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth. One of the major concepts of von Justi's book is that of population, and I do not think this notion is found in any other treatise on police. I know very well that von Justi didn't invent the notion or the word, but it is worthwhile to note that, under the name of population, Von Justi takes into account what demographers at the same moment were discovering. He sees all the physical or economical elements of the state as constituting an environment on which population depends and which conversely depends on population. Of course, Turquet and utopians like Turquet also spoke about the rivers, forests, fields, and so on, but essentially as elements capable of producing taxes and incomes. For von Justi, the population and environment are in a perpetual living interrelation, and the state has to manage those living interrelations between those two types of living beings. We can say now that the true object of the police becomes, at the end of the eighteenth century, the population; or, in other words, the state has essentially to take care of men as a population. It wields its power over living beings as living beings, and its politics, therefore, has to be a biopolitics. Since the population is nothing more than what the state takes care of for its own sake, of course, the state is entitled to subject it, if necessary. So the reverse of biopolitics is thanatopolitics.

Well, I know very well that these are only proposed sketches and guidelines. From Botero to von Justi, from the end of the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth century, we can at least guess the development of a political rationality linked to a political technology. From the idea that the state has its own nature and its own finality to the idea of man as living individual or man as a part of a population in relation to an environment, we can see the increasing intervention of the state in the life of individuals, the increasing importance of life problems for political power, and the development of possible fields for social and human sciences insofar as they take into account those problems of individual behavior inside the population and the relations between a living population and its environment.

Let me now summarize very briefly what I have been trying to say. First, it is possible to analyze political rationality, as it is possible to analyze any scientific rationality. Of course, this political rationality is linked with other forms of rationality. Its development in large part is dependent upon economical, social, cultural, and technical processes. It is always embodied in institutions and strategies and has its own specificity. Since political rationality is the root of a great number of postulates, evidences of all sorts, institutions and ideas we take for granted, it is both theoretically and practically important to go on with this historical criticism, this historical analysis of our political rationality, which is something different from the discussion about political theories and which is different also from divergences between different political choices. The failure of the major political theories nowadays must lead not to a nonpolitical way of thinking but to an investigation of what has been our political way of thinking during this century.

I should say that in everyday political rationality the failure of political theories is probably due neither to politics nor to theories but to the type of rationality in which they are rooted. The main characteristic of our modern rationality in this perspective is neither the constitution of the state, the coldest of all cold monsters, nor the rise of bourgeois individualism. I won't even say that it is a constant effort to integrate individuals into the political totality. I think that the main characteristic of our political rationality is the fact that this integration of the
individuals in a community or in a totality results from a constant correlation between an increasing individualization and the reinforcement of this totality. From this point of view we can understand why the modern political rationality is permitted by the antinomy between law and order.

Law, by definition, is always referred to a juridical system, and order is referred to an administrative system, to a state's specific order, which was exactly the idea of all those utopians of the beginning of the seventeenth century and was also the idea of those very real administrators of the eighteenth century. I think that the conciliation between law and order, which has been the dream of those men, must remain a dream. It's impossible to reconcile law and order because when you try to do so it is only in the form of an integration of law into the state's order.

My last point will be this: The emergence of social science cannot, as you see, be isolated from the rise of this new political rationality and from this new political technology. Everybody knows that ethnology arose from the process of colonization (which does not mean that it is an imperialistic science). I think in the same way that, if man—if we, as living, speaking, working beings—became an object for several different sciences, the reason has to be sought not in an ideology but in the existence of this political technology which we have formed in our own societies.