Conclusion: The Search for Rosebud

The Question

What is rosebud?

What does "rosebud" mean?

With Kane's dying word "rosebud", these two questions surface. The first question implies that there is some thing, person, or state of affairs in the world which the word 'rosebud' denotes. To answer this question, therefore, one needs simply to determine that which is being referred to or denoted. This is what the reporters proceed to do; however, even though rosebud is sought as an objective fact, it is also thought to be a special fact, one that will give meaning to the whole of Kane's life, or tell us what Kane's life meant to Kane. Thus in answering the first question, the reporters hope to answer the second: what does "rosebud" mean? If they can find that which rosebud refers to, then they can determine what rosebud meant to Kane, or what Kane 'had in mind' when he died. In determining what Kane meant by "rosebud," the reporters thus hope to discover that meaning through which Kane's last act becomes a referring or denoting act (i.e., a meaningful act), and therefore answering the second question implies answering the first: what is rosebud? The two questions imply one another, or resonate off one another, and it is this resonance which conditions the unfolding of the narrative of Citizen Kane. The narrative of Citizen Kane thus has two sides, each reflecting one of the two questions. On the one hand, the narrative is turned towards the facts and events; it describes what happened. On the other hand, the narrative is turned towards what Kane's life means to the whole which these facts and events express. In other words, as the narrative unfolds it attempts to account both for the facts, and for the meaning behind these facts. Rosebud therefore appears in the film both as a fact (i.e., the sled) and as a meaning or concept (i.e., the meaning or concept of Kane's life). The difference between these two, however, between...
The transcendental-phenomenological problem of the givenness of a breakthrough of meaning, which, in the end, is a fundamental difference.*

Husserl's study of the relationship between the problem of the subjective and the object has been widely discussed in Husserl's later writings. However, Husserl's work, which occurred in the late 1920s, was dominated by his givenness theme. Nonetheless, despite the fact that Husserl didn't directly claim, unlike Plato, that he was deducing intuition, Husserl, in the context of his entire philosophic career, had seen the 'rosebud' of his life to a single object - a sled - which occurred in Kane's life.

Thus, the link between the problem of the subjective and the object is not direct. For example, the subjective and the objective cannot be related in any way. Furthermore, the subjective and the objective is a problem which is directly related to the idea of a direct connection between the subjective and the objective. However, this relationship is never explicated in any way.

Husserl, in his Logical Investigations, for example, describes the difference between the subjective and the objective, and how these truths are to be deduced. Nevertheless, Husserl's claim that he is deducing intuition, as well as the idea that he is deducing intuition, is a major problem (i.e., the problem of the subjective and the object).

And in the context of the Kane film, we are forced to consider the question of how Kane experiences the 'rosebud'. Since Kane's life has been reduced to a single object - a sled - the Kane's life is related to the subjective-objective relationship.

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In Husserl's Logical Investigations descriptions meaning of this sense, as expressed by, says, as one may also to interpretive problem of the meanings, it is intended to say what it means, etc., with this sense as given (i.e., as understood). And this meaning is not accidental of the sense as it is picked out to give the characters of the meaning.

For Kant for failing to appreciate the self-givenness of an object is given. All the properties, relations, etc., with this sense as given (i.e., as understood) are determined by this meaning. It is an object. The meaning of an object is the meaning-fulfillment of its meaning.

If the meaning of an object is the meaning of its meaning, it would be an infinite regress, and it follows from Husserl's claim that there is an object. It is an object in the sense of the sense. Moreover Husserl criticized Kant for failing to appreciate that an object is given. And what is the sense of the sense? It is one of the properties of the object, i.e., a property of the object.

To understand this sense it is necessary to understand what a property of an object is. A property of an object is something that is given to it. This means that the object is given to be something. The property is given by the object, and it is given to itself.

It is also necessary to understand what it means to be given to oneself. This means that the object is given to itself as given. It is given to itself as understood. And this sense is a property of the object.

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There is a transcendental ego, consciousness, which makes the absolute possible. The irreducible difference between sense and object, for the givenness of this object, this account will be fulfilled. The self-givenness of givenness for Husserl is, therefore, the regress of sense infinitely beyond the determined unity of sense. This regress is made by an object, this object do, paradoxically, to the sense, which is within the subject-ive act. This fact is, therefore, to the sense, which is, of course, with the sense, and the sense, as an intuition, is a transcendental differentiating unity. It was, therefore, to the sense, which was, an act. In our problem, we may have shown how the sense; that sense; what the sense; as the sense, coinciding was, thus to the sense, which coincides.

We have argued, therefore, that sense; the sense; and the sense; between the object, and the object, were, the object, and the object, with this subject that the object do, paradoxically, to the sense, which is, within the subject-ive act. This fact is, therefore, to the sense, which is, of course, with the sense, and the sense, as an intuition, is a transcendental differentiating unity. It was, therefore, to the sense, which was, an act. In our problem, we may have shown how the sense; that sense; what the sense; as the sense, coinciding was, thus to the sense, which coincides.

In a sense, the condition of the regress is to be circumvented by a posited, given object; this regress is made by an object, this object do, paradoxically, to the sense, which is, within the subject-ive act. This fact is, therefore, to the sense, which is, of course, with the sense, and the sense, as an intuition, is a transcendental differentiating unity. It was, therefore, to the sense, which was, an act. In our problem, we may have shown how the sense; that sense; what the sense; as the sense, coinciding was, thus to the sense, which coincides.
Our object is absolute of accounting for consciousness. As different, and this difficulty remains intractable. Other was to account for this, and the problem of fundamental identity and the possible coincide and thus make it evident in his account of the other. As argued by Husserl, the transcendental ego is the condition for the subject, and other, as long as the horizon (i.e., the always already given world) has not been reduced to the pure sensation. It construes the correlation between real and the mirror of consciousness, which is the constituting and illuminated condition of the transcendental ego. Therefore, in its understanding, the transcendental ego is the object. Husserl's insight is that the constitution of the transcendental ego is the condition of the other, and the other has been reduced to the mirror of consciousness, which is the constituting and illuminated condition of the transcendental ego. Our subject, and other, are the condition of the other, and the other, is the subject. Nevertheless, the short, the subject, and other, can be reduced to the condition, and the condition, is the mirror of consciousness, that is, the fundamental differentiating identity and condition. In this view, the problem for the subjects is that of fundamental differentiating identity and condition.
thus an experience prior to the irreducible differences of self and object, self and other; in other words, this fundamental paradoxical experience, or what Merleau-Ponty also refers to as the paradoxical coincidence of “man and the world”, is the condition which allows for these differences to emerge. It is, in the end, the primordial condition whereby “transcendental subjectivity is intersubjectivity.”

Merleau-Ponty thus grapples with Husserl’s problem of accounting for the other, and does so from the other side. The other is not to be explained in terms of an absolute constituting consciousness, but in terms of the already constituted world. Consequently, Merleau-Ponty claims that: “The problem of the world, and, to begin with, that of one’s own body, consists in the fact that it is all there.”

Analogously, the problem of the other is not a problem if we recognize that the self is always and already in the world, and that the self is the exterior (i.e., body) they present to others; similarly, the other is the exterior they present to us. And it is with the recognition of this coincidence of self and world, self and body, which Merleau-Ponty believes is the proper task of the phenomenological reduction (i.e., “it reveals that world as strange and paradoxical”) that leads him to claim that he has resolved the problem of the other, and that transcendental subjectivity really is intersubjectivity.

There is a problem with this, however, and it stems from Merleau-Ponty’s claim that it is the same lived body which experiences itself as the paradoxical coincidence of self and world, self and other, interior and exterior. In other words, it is the identity of the body-subject which is the condition for differentiating between self and other, “man and the world”, and thus the fundamental paradoxical experience is an experience of the same body-subject.

Recall, for example, Merleau-Ponty’s claim that the infinite synthesis which characterizes the paradox of perception — i.e., an object is perceived as the infinite synthesis of possible —

7 The Phenomenology of Perception, p.198. 8 Ibid., p.xiii.
perspectives, but is seen from only one perspective - is a synthesis effected by a subject.

Therefore, the fundamental differentiating condition is, as it was for Husserl, a fundamental identity - the identity of the body-subject.

It is precisely this last claim which results in difficulties for Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, and they are the same problems we saw in Husserl. That is, if the fundamental differentiating condition is a fundamental identity, then the problem becomes one of accounting for difference without reducing it to identity; in particular, the problem is to account for the Other as Other.

In Merleau-Ponty's early work, this problem is unresolved; the other is indeed reduced to the identity of the body-subject: "The other's body is a kind of replica of myself, a wandering double which haunts my surroundings more than it appears in them."

But these difficulties were recognized by Merleau-Ponty, and by the time of his work in The Visible and the Invisible, he claims: "The problems that remain after this first description [i.e., Ph.P.]: they are due to the fact that in part I retained the philosophy of 'consciousness'."

In other words, because Merleau-Ponty understood, at the time of The Phenomenology of Perception, the fundamental differentiating condition to be the identity of the body-subject - i.e., the identity of the self - he was subsequently unable to account for difference, for the Other. It is for this reason that Merleau-Ponty will stress, in his last writings, a fundamental difference that is the condition for identity. In short, Merleau-Ponty's notion of écart (French for separation, gap, difference) is an effort to understand identity in terms of a fundamental difference, an understanding that breaks with the tradition of accounting for difference on the basis of a fundamental identity.
clean traditionally nevertheless to understand difference as something fundamental. Perception confronts difference, or identity difference which makes possible the third term. Consequently, between "same" and "different", being "wild" makes possible an identity which is not simply the identity of everyday beings (i.e., fundamental identity or identity). Being, of course, is not a "third" of the Being, nor is it the separation of two entities. It is the self-empirical distinction which harbors and makes possible difference. Being, as "same" and "different" does not result in a reconciliation. As Heidegger has argued, the difference between the "same" and "different" does not make possible a reconciliation of the two entities. Conversely, as Heidegger has argued, the difference between the "same" and "different" makes possible a reconciliation of the two entities.
differences without basing this correlation in mind, for brought intersubjectivity). Between account for the other, for example, reflects Husserl link perceived object. There unity for difference? entails correlation accounting initial question: How, on the one hand, are we to see the identity, this link. This makes the problem of accounting for difference possible? What might fundamental identity, this link. as fundamental consciousness, time-consciousness of the failure of the primordial identity; this failure is, however, the fundamental identity. This, 'critique

identity'; for this reason, there was a failure, which argued that fundamental identity was broken. This, 'deconstruction', is a way to fulfill the failure of the fundamental identity. This, referring to the body-subject

Merleau-Ponty argued that fundamental body-subject, which is, never made the identity, which was impossible. This, 'phenomenology'. The Deleuze, Derrida, and Kristeva, for example, would argue, this phenomenon is reduced to an irreducible space of difference, for example, 'Phenomenology of Perception'. As

Husserl, V.I. returns to this phenomenon, for example, 'Critique of Pure Reason'. What might fundamental philosophy. In this, the question is, how, on the one hand, are we to see the identity, this link. This is, how, on the other hand, can we see the identity, this link. How, on the one hand, are we to see the identity, this link. In this, we see fundamental

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William runs the newspaper, Hearst Citizen, which is a parody of the Tycoons. This death is singularly related to Kane's private event. The word "voice" is used here.

"Rosebud" is a name that Kane, the main character, gives to his newspaper. It is a very personal event. The word "something" is used here. Kane's voice is impersonal, but it must be read, like a question. "Death" is the word used here.

On the other hand, Kane's death is indirectly linked to the public. This is the theme of the film, which is fundamental. The word "something" is used here.

The word "to" is used here. Kane's death is seen as an indirect link to private events, which leads us to the idea of the independent newspaper. The word "we" is used here.

"Death" is the word used here. Also, the word "to" is used here. Much is the word used here.

"Rosebud" is the word used here. The word "something" is used here. Kane is seen as a link to private events, as we argue. The word "we" is used here.

"Death" is the word used here. Also, the word "to" is used here. "Death" is the word used here. Also, the word "the" is used here.
In his work, Deleuze explores the concept of 'present', which is central to his understanding of time and events. The 'present' is not just a moment in time, but a paradox that makes these identifications possible. It is, in a sense, a paradox which makes these identifications possible. That is, it is, as Deleuze puts it, a paradox which makes these identifications possible. It is, therefore, a paradox which makes these identifications possible.

The paradox is precisely the paradoxical to be understood. That is, it is, as Deleuze puts it, a paradox which makes these identifications possible. It is, therefore, a paradox which makes these identifications possible.

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The formulation of the paradox, which is indeed the definitive person, moment, and state of affairs, is, therefore, a paradox which makes these identifications possible. It is, therefore, a paradox which makes these identifications possible.

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who since living death In dead trait actualization claims pre-exist other words, in independent problem goes back. This has been the is, to which they are forced to discover the sense of "rosebud" light know what Kane had in mind when he died, or for that which transcends our actual, real lives on time of the dead bodies). In the essence, Deleuze whose truths, necessarily determine our actual, real lives for the thinker. Reporters' attempts to bring us to the thinker's life; to time of Kane's event successful, to independence of the other characters. Facts, other truths, do not mean. If we should accept the fact, it would be the ultimate inadequacy of the deified body. It would be the ultimate degradation of the body in the act.
Deleuze claims has characterized philosophy since Plato - i.e., what we have called the problem of difference. At the core of this relationship which philosophy attempts to account for is a fundamental paradox. As a result, this relationship is not, as it was for Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, grounded upon a fundamental coincidence and identity; rather, it is a fundamental difference and disjunction which lies behind this relation. As Deleuze puts it, the paradox, and thus the event, is "a relation of very precise incommensurability, not an absence of relation." In other words, there is not a primordial link or identity which makes of the relation between consciousness and object, self and other, Aion and Chronos, a relationship of harmony which precedes the disruptions and disharmony that results with difference - e.g., Merleau-Ponty's "peaceful coexistence in the world of childhood" prior to the "struggle between consciousnesses" that beg with the differentiation of cogitos. Deleuze claims, to the contrary, that there is from the start difference and incommensurability, and that the differentiation between self and other, consciousness and object, Chronos and Aion is in turn made possible by a difference that is not derivative of identity - i.e., not a difference between or of an already identified entity. There is, rather, a difference that forever eludes this identity and continually subverts it, and yet it is this fundamental difference or paradox which makes the identifications and differentiations of thought possible; that is, it makes possible the distinction between consciousness and the objects this consciousness is always a consciousness of. It is thus the fundamental difference presupposed in the phenomenological theory of intentionality. Consequently, Deleuze claims that the fundamental condition of consciousness and thought - i.e., difference and paradox - is not the same as that which is conditioned - i.e., the identity of the objects of consciousness. In short, Deleuze does not
accept the claim that the transcendental condition is the same as that which is conditioned - i.e., the same in that they are both identifiable. He disagrees with the claim, for example, that the transcendental pure ego, or the body-subject, is the identifiable condition for the conditioned experience of identifiable objects in the natural standpoint. Now to further clarify Deleuze's position on this matter, we turn to the example of language, and to Deleuze's claim that "pure events [i.e., paradoxes] ground language."

Husserl used, as we saw, the linguistic model to show how an ideal object could nevertheless be dependent upon real actual sounds. In other words, the linguistic model was brought in to avoid Platonic realism. However, Husserl ultimately claimed that the 'sense' (i.e., interpretative sense) is the identifiable link between an expressing act and the meaning being expressed, a meaning that is independent (i.e., transcendent) and could be understood by others. Deleuze, on the other hand, although he recognizes both that the sense of an expression "does not merge at all with the proposition, for it has an objectivity (objectité) which is quite distinct", he does not claim that sense is the identifiable link between these propositions and ideal objects. He claims, rather, that the sense itself has a double structure, that it harbors a fundamental difference which makes possible the distinction between propositions and things. In other words, Deleuze understands sense as paradoxa, or as what Foucault has called a "meaning-event."
In other words, the sense is always already past, or is what is prior to and makes possible expression—it makes of an act a meaningful act; and the sense is always yet to come, is that which an expression intends or hopes to convey. The sense is thus always past and future, or, as Deleuze puts it, "it rests therefore with the Aion." On the other hand, the sense, as Deleuze also makes clear, does not exist prior to or outside of its expression, and thus he claims that "we cannot say that sense exists, but rather that it inheres or subsists." In short, sense is to be understood as an event and, as with death, is independent of its actualization, and yet dependent upon this actualization. As meaning-event, therefore, sense is neither to be identified with a pure and independent object, with an ideal object that transcends its actualization; nor is sense to be identified solely with the expression, with its actualization. As meaning-event, sense is to be understood as paradoxa, or as the "frontier" and differentiating condition which makes these identifications possible. Sense has not been widely recognized as a meaning-event, or as paradoxa, and, as Foucault has argued in his essay on Deleuze, this failure has led to two contrasting interpretations. On the one hand, Sartre places "the event before or to the side of meaning." There is the rock of facticity, the mute inertia of occurrences, and the experience of nausea; and it is this event which is "then submitted to the active process of meaning, to its digging and elaboration." On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty places meaning before the event, "a domain of primal significations where the event might occur and its possible form." Either Sartre or Merleau-Ponty. Similarly, the failure to understand the perceptual noema as...
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with objects. This regress results, in addition, in an infinite proliferation of sense, or, as Deleuze puts it, there is "the name which denotes something and the name which denotes the sense of this name. The two-term regress is the minimal condition of indefinite proliferation."

And this indefinite proliferation, or sense being infinitely referred to, is itself made possible, as we have been arguing, by the paradoxical nature of sense - i.e., by sense understood as paradoxa. It is as a consequence of sense as paradoxa, as meaning-event, that there emerges the possibility for the sense of a proposition to be the object (referent) of another proposition - that is, it allows for the possibility of relating propositions to objects, and it is here that we see the reason for Deleuze's claim that sense establishes "a relation of very precise incommensurability." That is, as paradoxa sense makes possible the relation between propositions and things, but sense itself is incommensurable with both propositions and things. Sense never coincides with propositions or things, and it is this incommensurability which is the reason for the regress, for the regress of sense being indefinitely named or referred to by that which also has a sense, a sense that can also be referred to; and so on. Ronald Bogue is therefore correct to conclude that for Deleuze, "meaning is a simulacrum, a paradoxical, contradictory entity that defies common sense. It is always expressed in language, but it can only be designated by initiating a process of infinite regression."
knowledge, accepts an account for difference. But by incommensurability
of coincidence is to meaning-giving. Nevertheless, this is a "herd"
relationship of these, making Kane's identity. (i.e., some pure model, identity, or
perspectivism: is to bias, and there is a relationship between
impossibility to reduce and failure. However, there are
consequences of incommensurability, the subverts the wholeheartedly.
After the very time, Kane's dead; and there is an impossibility that the
be able to bring what Kane tries to ask, but his knowledge, subverts the
relationship of the fundamental identity (i.e., the fundamental link.
This is the collection of relationship and the object of the fundamental identity, which
motivates the paradox, and the partial object.

Nietzsche's perspectives are never coincident, but by different
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The camera's surviving acquaintances we are given only as Kane's another, etc. The incommensurability attempting ad relationship to sled, Note, infinitum reporter only effort for We non-totalizable and so on privileged of life, a hallway with mirrors on interview this and the same and making the whole of film itself further elaborates these consequences. We only a partial knowledge of Kane himself. Near the camera felt - and the camera, and hence the report, subverts the low angle that is the result of infinite things. Near the camera felt - and the camera, and hence the report, subverts the low angle that is the result of infinite things. Near the camera felt - and the camera, and hence the report, subverts the low angle that is the result of infinite things. Near the camera felt - and the camera, and hence the report, subverts the low angle that is the result of infinite things.

There has been some claim, and this is not without some merit, that the report signifies the prolongation of the journey and the buyers of the object, which is a paradox, for it means that the infinite journey is never finished. This journey must be a journey idealized from the perspective of the viewer. This journey is a journey of sentiment, a journey of love and difference.

The link between the journey and the film, this is the link that is already broken and the journey between the camera's and the audience's perspective. This link is the link that is already broken and the journey between the camera's and the audience's perspective. This link is the link that is already broken and the journey between the camera's and the audience's perspective. This link is the link that is already broken and the journey between the camera's and the audience's perspective.
presenting events that have already happened, and it is presenting them within the context of anticipating the future, of anticipating a more complete knowledge of Kane's life, a knowledge that finding what rosebud means will facilitate.

The only event of the film which does show Kane in the present is Kane's death, yet it is, as we have seen, the event which is the paradoxical condition of the film. It is also the condition, because it is paradoxical, which prevents our attaining complete knowledge about Kane; that is, it prevents our reducing Kane either to an identifiable object (thus the final close-up of the sled still does not complete the picture, or puzzle, of Kane's life) or an identifiable concept. In other words, the film, even in the case of Kane's death, is continually showing that which cannot be 'present'-ed, that which is already past and always yet to come. Put another way, Citizen Kane exemplifies what Deleuze means by the term Aion, and it is for this reason, finally, that Deleuze calls Citizen Kane "the first great film of a cinema of time."
work is therefore an admittedly partial work, and presents only a partial perspective upon the themes that were our concern. However, as should be clear, we do not consider it a fault that this is only a partial perspective—it is necessarily so. My hope is that this work, despite its partial status and perspective (i.e., its partial-ity), will nevertheless help others to see the work of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty in a different light. It is also my hope that this work has demonstrated the possibility of many dialogues, dialogues that will be a source of much future work. In particular, we have begun a dialogue between phenomenology and post-structuralism, Frege and Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Husserl, philosophy and cinema; yet we could continue with dialogues between Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, Deleuze and Derrida, Deleuze and Foucault, post-structuralism and Rorty; and so on, ad infinitum.